As you hinted, some of these predate even Hu. In terms of the security state stuff has to take into account of what he did in Tibet, which made him much less reformist at least than Wen. I’d like to think Hu (and Wen), like Jiang, were still scarred by the takedown of Hu Yaobang & Zhao Ziyang and his inclination would be to consolidate and let someone else (which comes in the concrete form of Li Keqiang, and to a lesser extent Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang) do the hard work. And to that end there was hope with Xi, given the image of Xi Zhongxun and Xi’s own record in Fujian and Zhejiang. Shame it all came to naught in the end.
A thought experiment: If a more vigorous and shrewd Hu Jintao had taken power in 2012, would China look different today? Xi’s political acumen lies in co-opting his predecessors' agenda, doubling down on execution and speed, and replacing core tenets with his own.
I’m highly skeptical of the 2012 anecdote for several reasons. Hu’s total resignation wasn't a nod to Xi; he had no real choice. He lacked the power and the pretext to hold onto the CMC chairmanship—a post where he never truly held the reins. Given Hu’s notoriously cautious, rigid, and rule-bound persona, it’s hard to imagine him attempting what could be seen as power plays, like introducing the new leadership on stage.
As heir-apparent, watching Hu’s inability to push his agenda for five years could hardly have inspired much respect in Xi. The new historical resolution and the 20th Party Congress report are scathing indictments of Hu’s era without naming. Those words couldn't have been pleasant for the man sitting on the stage.
Speculation of deliberate humiliation aside, the outcome of the 20th Congress shows Xi understands Chinese politics far better than Hu and others: it’s not about order or respect in Confucian culture; it’s a street fight in a "you die, I live" world.
Interesting stuff, I had offend wondering what the motivation was behind the infamous “escorting Hu out” incident was all about. Great read!
As you hinted, some of these predate even Hu. In terms of the security state stuff has to take into account of what he did in Tibet, which made him much less reformist at least than Wen. I’d like to think Hu (and Wen), like Jiang, were still scarred by the takedown of Hu Yaobang & Zhao Ziyang and his inclination would be to consolidate and let someone else (which comes in the concrete form of Li Keqiang, and to a lesser extent Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang) do the hard work. And to that end there was hope with Xi, given the image of Xi Zhongxun and Xi’s own record in Fujian and Zhejiang. Shame it all came to naught in the end.
A thought experiment: If a more vigorous and shrewd Hu Jintao had taken power in 2012, would China look different today? Xi’s political acumen lies in co-opting his predecessors' agenda, doubling down on execution and speed, and replacing core tenets with his own.
I’m highly skeptical of the 2012 anecdote for several reasons. Hu’s total resignation wasn't a nod to Xi; he had no real choice. He lacked the power and the pretext to hold onto the CMC chairmanship—a post where he never truly held the reins. Given Hu’s notoriously cautious, rigid, and rule-bound persona, it’s hard to imagine him attempting what could be seen as power plays, like introducing the new leadership on stage.
As heir-apparent, watching Hu’s inability to push his agenda for five years could hardly have inspired much respect in Xi. The new historical resolution and the 20th Party Congress report are scathing indictments of Hu’s era without naming. Those words couldn't have been pleasant for the man sitting on the stage.
Speculation of deliberate humiliation aside, the outcome of the 20th Congress shows Xi understands Chinese politics far better than Hu and others: it’s not about order or respect in Confucian culture; it’s a street fight in a "you die, I live" world.
I think so. He’s shrewdly ruthless and like Stalin he will be there until he dies or someone helps him die.