Today’s Politburo meeting

Most likely an administrative clean-up, but why now?

Today’s Politburo meeting has set the cat (black or white you ask!) among the pigeons.^[1] It passed something called the ‘Working Regulations of the Decision-making, Deliberative and Coordinating Bodies of the CPC Central Committee (党中央决策议事协调机构工作条例)’. The regulations are not yet available, which has spurred much speculation about what they are.

My guess is that – rather than a handful of brave elders organising a take-over - this is an administrative step to put some order to the large number of commissions, leading groups and other Party organs that have proliferated since 2012. (In this I agree with Substacker “Pixy”, whose comments I saw after I’d written this.) The release itself tells us that it’s meant to strengthen the unified leadership of the Center (是健全党中央对重大工作集中统一领导)… (and if you need a reminder of what ‘the Center’ is these days, take a look at this. Clue: It’s not the Central Committee.)

Where does the remit and decision-making powers of the Central Commission on Comprehensively Deepening Reform (中央全面深化改革委员会) end, and where does that of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) begin? (After all doesn’t the PBSC, on behalf of the Central Committee, supposed to do all the 决策-ing (deciding)?) How does the relatively new Central Party Work on Society Department (中国共产党中央委员会社会部) work with the Party’s Organisation Department and Discipline and Inspection Commissions? Do these organisations report into the Secretariat or into the Politburo or the General Secretary personally? (And what is the Secretariat doing these days anyway, given its role, at least since the early 1990s, has been to co-ordinate the Politburo’s work?) And how do the State Council’s ministries relate to these Party organs? If the latter has all the policy making power, should the ministries be reporting in and/or have their work assessed by the Party organs? 等等.

There’s also a small line in the Politburo statement today that echoes the target of the Eight Rules campaign: ‘We must strive to avoid formalism and bureaucracy and seek practical results in our work (要力戒形式主义、官僚主义，工作务求实效)’. So that campaign, which I explored in March - prefiguring the Party’s prohibitionist turn - likely revealed some co-ordination problems.

An interesting question is: Why the need for rules today? Up until now, the lack of a formal system has allowed the boss to push decisions around the system, not just side-lining the government, but side-stepping the Politburo and its Standing Committee when he wanted too. Maybe now he has total control of the PBSC he can begin to constrain the ambit of the other Party organs? Perhaps he is considering devolving the chairing of these organs to his subordinates, in which case he wants it clear who reports to who?

Another theory might be that it is succession planning. When there’s a new General Secretary, for a smooth transition, there will need to be formal clarity over where decisions are made, where power resides. The risk with the system that the boss has created is that absent the boss with all his committee hats, all the Party organs, then led by different PBSC members, could quickly devolve into rival (and relatively autonomous) power centers.

Welcome your thoughts.

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^[1] Xinhuawang, ‘中共中央政治局召开会议 审议《党中央决策议事协调机构工作条例》 中共中央总书记习近平主持会议 [The Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee Held a Meeting to Review the “Working Regulations of the Decision-Making, Deliberative and Coordinating Bodies of the CPC Central Committee”. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Presided over the Meeting.]’, 30 June 2025, http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/20250630/cb9d9fde908e445dbdb8142c0e0e1d4e/c.html.