In the recent State Council Constitutional Oath Swearing ceremony[1], Premier Li Qiang did not mention the “two establishments” (两个确立) or the “two protects” (两个维护) in his speech, as he did last year at the same event. Was he throwing a tiny bit of shade on his boss? Short answer: I don’t think so.
Long answer…
The State Council and its 38 ministry-level organs[2] started the oath ceremony in 2016.[3] They sing the national anthem and then, led by their Secretary General (秘书长), they raise their right fist and repeat the words:
I swear: to be loyal to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, to uphold the authority of the Constitution, to perform statutory duties, to be loyal to the Motherland and the people, to perform my duties conscientiously, to be honest and upright, to accept the supervision of the people, and to strive for the construction of a prosperous, democratic, civilized, harmonious and beautiful modern socialist power! (我宣誓:忠于中华人民共和国宪法,维护宪法权威,履行法定职责,忠于祖国、忠于人民,恪尽职守、廉洁奉公,接受人民监督,为建设富强民主文明和谐美丽的社会主义现代化强国努力奋斗!)
That’s followed by a speech by the Premier, which is where those key words did not appear this year.[4]
That was in contrast to his 2024 remarks, when newly-appointed Premier Li Qiang said, among other things:
We must persist in using Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era to arm our minds, guide our practice, and promote our work, firmly support the "two establishments" and resolutely implement the "two safeguards” (要坚持以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想武装头脑、指导实践、推动工作,坚定拥护“两个确立”、坚决做到“两个维护”).
For the uninitiated, the “two establishments” establish Xi as the core of the Central Committee, and his thought as having a guiding rule. And the “two protects”, a slogan of slightly older vintage, protect him as the core of the Central Committee, and protect the authority and unified leadership of the Central Committee with Xi at its core. Basically, they’re both signals that Xi is the undisputed boss, while threading the needle with the idea embedded in the Party Charter that the Central Committee is the highest organ of Party power.
This time, while Premier Li remains a fan of Xi Thought, he missed out those two slogans. Given all the rumours these days, this spurred some to wonder whether this was a sign of Xi’s diminished authority. Or perhaps as a sign of Premier Li’s increased autonomy, as Neil Thomas has discussed recently.[5]
I think the evidence is very limited. First, Premier Li, as all in all previous ceremonies, committed to Xi Thought and called on everyone to fully implement the decisions of the Central Committee. Plus he repeated concepts that are well known as Xi’s, including achieving high quality development via Chinese-style modernisation, and the need to “strengthen the will to dare to fight and be good at fighting (强化敢于斗争、善于斗争的意志).” He also called on the assembled ministers to “forge firm loyalty (铸牢忠诚)”, a loyalty owed to the General Secretary.
Second, when one looks back at previous ceremonies under Premier Li Keqiang, the two slogans came and went. The “two protects” was created as a slogan in 2018, the “two establishments” in November 2021. So, of course they do not appear in Li’s speeches at the 2016 or 2017 ceremonies.[6] He then did not use them in 2018[7], mentioned the “two protects” in 2019[8], but said nothing about either in 2020[9], 2021[10] or 2022[11], at least according to the official transcripts. Of course, Li Keqiang had a strained, at best, relationship with his boss – but it’s clear that there is no requirement to use these slogans at these events.
When he took over the premiership in 2023, Li Qiang used them both, signalling loyalty to his boss.[12] Indeed he went much further:
No matter what situation we face or what storms we go through, we must maintain a high degree of unity with the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core in terms of ideology, politics and actions, and be loyal to the Constitution, the motherland and the people. (无论面对什么样的形势,经历什么样的风浪,都要在思想上政治上行动上同以习近平同志为核心的党中央保持高度一致,忠于宪法,忠于祖国,忠于人民.)
We didn’t get any of that in 2024, when Li focused on rule of law and clean government, or this time, when his remarks were about improving officials’ judgements and boosting domestic demand.
I’d say there’s still not much to see here.[13] It wasn’t a break in precedent because a precedent had never been established. And Premier Li still called for “firm loyalty” (to Xi), highlighted the leading role of Xi Thought and for his officials to implement Xi’s concepts.
[1] ‘国务院举行宪法宣誓仪式 李强总理监誓 [The State Council Held a Constitutional Oath-Taking Ceremony, with Premier Li Qiang Supervising]’, CCTV 1 Evening News [新闻联播], 11 June 2025, https://archive.ph/iaOFD, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/06/11/VIDE6XJSswXaEFxf1LvIh0fX250611.shtml?spm=C31267.PXDaChrrDGdt.EbD5Beq0unIQ.9.
[2] Now there are 42.
[3] The National People’s Congress passed a law requiring government officials to make the oath in July 2015. ‘全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于 实行宪法宣誓制度的决定 [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the Implementation of the Constitution Oath System]’, 24 February 2018, https://archive.ph/9mTMR, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-02/24/content_5268528.htm.The State Council followed up with its own implementing regulations in 2016. ‘国务院办公厅关于印发国务院及其各部门任命国家工作人员宪法宣誓组织办法的通知 [Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Issuing the Measures for Organizing the Constitutional Oath of State Personnel Appointed by the State Council and Its Departments]’, 21 July 2016, https://archive.ph/2DXnC, https://www.055110.com/law/1/20462.html. Ministers, deputy ministers, and department directors all have to make the oath, although the televised ceremony is just for deputy premier and minister-level officials.
[4] Just to highlight: At no point has the oath itself included the “two establishments” etc.
[5] Neil Thomas, ‘China’s Overlooked Premier Is Slowly Building up Power’, Foreign Policy, 5 June 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/06/05/li-qiang-china-premier-economy/. And Youshu, ‘Li Qiang’s Mini-Rise’, 15 June 2025, https://youshu.substack.com/p/li-qiangs-mini-rise, https://archive.ph/TnOI7.
[6] ‘国务院举行宪法宣誓仪式 李克强总理监誓 [The State Council Held a Constitutional Oath Ceremony, Premier Li Keqiang Supervised the Oath]’, China Government Web [中国政府网], 18 September 2016, https://archive.ph/N6d96, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-09/18/content_5109122.htm. ‘国务院举行宪法宣誓仪式 李克强总理监誓 [The State Council Held a Constitutional Oath Ceremony, Premier Li Keqiang Supervised the Oath]’, China Government Web [中国政府网], 3 July 2017, https://archive.ph/Depbb, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-07/03/content_5207685.htm.
[7] ‘国务院举行宪法宣誓仪式 李克强总理监誓 [The State Council Held a Constitutional Oath Ceremony, Premier Li Keqiang Supervised the Oath]’, China Government Web [中国政府网], 20 November 2018, https://archive.ph/VqCH3, https://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2018-11/20/content_5342019.htm.
[8] ‘国务院举行宪法宣誓仪式 李克强总理监誓 [The State Council Held a Constitutional Oath Ceremony, Premier Li Keqiang Supervised the Oath]’, China Government Web [中国政府网], 8 July 2019, https://archive.ph/EUhNG, https://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2019-07/08/content_5407373.htm.
[9] ‘国务院举行宪法宣誓仪式 李克强总理监誓 [The State Council Held a Constitutional Oath Ceremony, Premier Li Keqiang Supervised the Oath]’, China Government Web [中国政府网], 29 September 2020, https://archive.ph/1zSrG, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-09/29/content_5548245.htm.
[10] ‘国务院举行宪法宣誓仪式 李克强总理监誓 [The State Council Held a Constitutional Oath Ceremony, Premier Li Keqiang Supervised the Oath]’, People’s Daily [人民日报], 18 March 2021, https://archive.ph/2MMI6, https://www.gjbmj.gov.cn/n1/2021/0318/c409080-32054223.html.
[11] Xinhuashe [新华社], ‘国务院举行宪法宣誓仪式 李克强总理监誓 [The State Council Held a Constitutional Oath Ceremony, Premier Li Keqiang Supervised the Oath]’, 16 March 2022, https://archive.ph/IPJIi, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-03/16/content_5679406.htm.
[12] ‘国务院举行宪法宣誓仪式 [The State Council Held a Constitutional Oath Ceremony]’, People’s Daily [人民日报], 16 June 2023, https://archive.ph/HsM0T, http://m.people.cn/n4/2023/0616/c190-20636140.html.
[13] One could possibly speculate that one doesn’t need to state the “two establishments” formally these days as there is zero doubt about Xi’s “core” status.
There's one thing about Li Qiang that's always struck me as a bit odd: Xi often holds important meetings, attended by all other PBSC members, while Li is absent or out of the country.
Here are a few examples:
2023.6.19 “中国共产主义青年团第十九次全国代表大会”
6 PBSC members attended. Li Qiang was visiting Germany.
2024.1.16 “习近平在省部级主要领导干部推动金融高质量发展专题研讨班开班式上发表重要讲话”
6 PBSC members plus Han Zheng attended. Li Qiang was visiting Switzerland.
2024.8.22 “中共中央举行纪念邓小平同志诞辰120周年座谈会 ”
6 PBSC members plus Han Zheng attended. Li Qiang was visiting Russia and Belarus.
2023.10.9 “中国工会第十八次全国代表大会” 6 PBSC members attended. Li Qiang was on an inspection tour in Zhejiang.
I don't really watch Xinwen Lianbo much, but I feel like Li Qiang's missed even more meetings than just these.
Neil's article is pretty convincing, but it actually just deepens my suspicions. He wrote: "He has visited more G20 countries in his first two years as premier than Li Keqiang did in the opening years of either of his terms, implying that Xi trusts him more to manage major diplomatic assignments."
I'm really looking forward to your take on this. I've got a few theories:
1. Xi's power plays. It's a reasonable guess that as Xi gives Li more power to do more, he'd deliberately try to keep him down in other areas. This is a common tactic for Chinese rulers.
2. Cai Qi's manipulation. Cai, as the head of the General Office, wields immense power. He controls crucial Party meeting schedules, agendas, and information flow. It's possible he's intentionally excluding Li from some key meetings, either at Xi's subtle hint or on his own initiative. Wu Guoguang touched on this dynamic in his 2023 article, "Li Qiang Versus Cai Qi in the Xi Jinping Leadership: Checks and Balances with CCP Characteristics?"
3.Li deliberately keeping a low profile. I think this is less likely. The logic here would be similar to not holding the Premier's press conference, or using a chartered plane instead of a special plane. He might want to emphasize that he's just the emperor's servant, not on par with the General Secretary, and not involved in succession politics.
I totally admit this is pure Pekingology, but these are my best guesses.