The incoming Fourth plenum: will it be lame or epic?
Who am I kidding!?! All plenums are lit.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) usually holds seven plenums – Latin for “a big, fancy meeting” – between each Congress.
The first plenum always takes place directly after the big Congress to “elect” the new Politburo etc., after which the guys run the red carpet. #2 appoints government personnel. The seventh plenum preps the Congress just about to star. It’s only #3-6 which usually have any substantive output. They’re not set in stone, but #3 is usually about economics (these days), as is #5, while #6 is more flexible.
The Fourth is usually about politics.[1] They tend to pass resolutions themed around “party construction” or “advance governance by the law”. The last one, in October 2019, passed one on “governance capacity”[2], i.e. strengthening the ability of the Party to run the country.
These days congresses take place every five years. Plenums numbers #2 and #3 usually take the place in the year after a Congress, but otherwise the sessions are usually one per year. The Party’s charter, last revised in October 2022, require a plenum “at least once a year”.[3]
This time around – for reasons much speculated about – #2 was in 2023, but #3 got pushed into 2024. You can see that delay in this chart. That has scrunched up the rest of the schedule.
That presents the boss with a challenge. Given the next five-year plan (the 15th) starts next year, the Fifth Plenum needs to be held this year to sign off on it. You probably want to have the Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) – which focuses on just 2026 work – after that, which means Plenum #5 needs to be held in around October this year, and the CEWC in Nov/Dec. Which in turn means Plenum #4 probably needs to be held in Aug/Sept.
Funerals aside, the General Secretary has not been shown much on TV recently, causing much speculation. And some of the reported meetings he’s had, with Belarusia’s Lukashenko (June 4th)[4] and the Panchen Llama (June 6th)[5], were “at home” in Zhongnanhai, rather in the more usual Great Hall of the People or Diaoyutai. My guess is that he’s holding a lot of meetings to prep for the Fourth and wants to stay close to the office.
But why so busy?
It’s rare that Plenum see major personal changes at the top of the party, though those officially found guilty of corruption have been expelled from the Central Committee at these meetings, and new CC members elected. So one should expect several of the PLA Central Committee members, including Miao Hua (苗华), to be officially excluded this time. (Miao’s case has now concluded.) That likely means a new Central Military Commission (中央军委) member (and Political Commissar) should be appointed at the Fourth. (He Hongjun (何宏军), the official current executive deputy of the PLA’s Political Work Department (政治工作部) may not be in a position to succeed him, given rumours of his death).
Another possible Xi move would be to fill the “empty” 25th seat on the Politburo, by bringing in one of his up-and-coming provincial Party Secretaries. The last time the PB changed at a Fourth was in 1994, when Huang Ju (黄菊), a Jiang Zemin (江泽民) ally, was added. He Weidong’s (何卫东) place on the Politburo (and vice chair spot at the Central Military Commission) will probably take a while longer to free up, though; these investigations tend to last for months.[7]
You have to go back to 1989 for a change in the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) at the Fourth.[6] And that was an eventful year; it just happened to be that the Fourth was the next meeting in line after the clampdown.
It’s not impossible that the Fourth sees moves at the PBSC. I’ve heard some chatter around Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Jining (陈吉宁) or A.N. Other joining. The boss is clearly entirely relaxed with breaking conventions. Also, Shi Taifeng’s (石泰峰) recent elevation to running the Organization Department suggests he is dissatisfied with the current team’s performance (though him and the sidelined Li Ganjie (李干杰) are only PB, of course). Such mid-term changes in jobs at the top are very, very rare, though. I’m sceptical, but not waiting till the 21st Congress to refresh the team would be a boss move.
[1] The last time the main topic was economics was at the Fourth Plenum of the 15th Congress in 1999, when the Central Committee signed off on large-scale state-owned enterprise reform.
[2] ‘中共中央关于坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度 推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化若干重大问题的决定 [Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Several Major Issues Concerning Upholding and Improving the Socialist System with Chinese Characteristics and Promoting the Modernization of the National Governance System and Governance Capacity]’ (Xinhua, 5 November 2019), https://archive.ph/qYI8v, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-11/05/content_5449023.htm. Passed at the Fourth Plenum of the 19thCongress.
[3] CCP Central Committee, ‘中国共产党章程 [Charter of the Communist Party of China]’, October 2022, https://archive.ph/jWUd8, https://www.12371.cn/special/zggcdzc/zggcdzcqw/#disanzhang.
[4] ‘Xi Jinping Meets with Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko’, Xinhua, 4 June 2025, https://archive.ph/xjVoE, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202506/t20250605_11641419.html.
[5] Christopher Bodeen, ‘China’s Panchen Lama Pledges Loyalty to the Communist Party in a Meeting with Xi’, AP, 6 June 2025, https://archive.ph/pvRpU, https://apnews.com/article/china-tibet-lama-panchen-dalai-0545436ef5fb3de3f69fe2a45fbe2370.
[6] General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳) was accused of anti-revolutionary errors and dismissed from all posts. Jiang Zemin (江泽民) was appointed General Secretary and joined the PBSC, as did the immortal Song Ping (宋平) and Li Ruihuan (李瑞环).
[7] Though adding one or two new generals to the CMC as members might work.