Li Qiang's mini-rise
A quick response to Neil Thomas's excellent piece.
I just wanted to give this new piece by the Asia' Society’s Neil Thomas about Premier Li Qiang (李强) a quick shout-out.[1] It really is excellent, as one would expect from an analyst of his calibre.
In it, Thomas argues that there are signs that the boss trusts Li Qiang and, as a result, that Li and his State Council has gained a little more room for manoeuvre, possibly even greater decision-making authority. (You can be the Chairman of Everything, but you can’t do everything, after all.) The contrast with former premier Li Keqiang (李克强) and his side-lined State Council is stark.
Two things I wondered about – and these are very much ‘blemishes which cannot obscure the jade’s lustre (瑕不掩瑜)’, as I really do think the piece is very well done.
First, as Thomas rightly notes, the Central Commission for Comprehensively Deepening Reform (CCCDR, 中央全面深化改革委员会) and Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission (CFEAC, 中央财经委员会) have both officially met far fewer times in this term than in Xi’s previous two terms. The implication appears to be that the State Council has a little more space to operate.
Second, the recent rule changes governing the State Council, which reduces executive meeting times from once a week to 2-3 times a month.[2] The implication appears to be that this gives Li a little more autonomy.
I don’t doubt that Li is trusted more than Li Keqiang, but I also wonder if these two changes might be indicating something else.
First, the Center is ever-more paranoid about outsiders knowing what’s going on inside – and so it might be those key Party meetings are still taking place, but are just not being reported. And second, it would make more sense for the State Council to meet less frequently if the key decisions were being taken elsewhere.
I’m only suggesting an alternative interpretation, and definitely not casting shade on Thomas’ core argument. Li Qiang, after all, is deputy chair at both the CCCDR and CFEAC, and Thomas has marshalled plenty of other evidence for his case. It’s just that I wonder if the boss would give up his Party-centric institutional reforms quite so easily.
[1] Neil Thomas, ‘China’s Overlooked Premier Is Slowly Building up Power’, Foreign Policy, 5 June 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/06/05/li-qiang-china-premier-economy/.
[2] Compare and contrast the 2018 and 2023 rules: State Council [国务院], ‘国务院工作规则 2018 [State Council Work Regulations 2018]’, 2 July 2018, https://archive.ph/ImAaz, https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/国务院工作规则_(2018年); State Council [国务院], ‘国务院工作规则 2023 [State Council Work Regulations 2023]’, 17 March 2023, https://archive.ph/shr8b, https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/国务院工作规则.
a diplomatic response to that piece. what do you think about this, from sinocism Thursday:
The readout of Li Qiang's comments at the Wednesday State Council ceremony for officials to pledge allegiance to the Constitution did not include the usual formulaic language "a deep understanding of the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes’; and the strengthening of the ‘Four Consciousnesses,’ firming of the 'Four Confidences,’ and realization of the ‘Two Upholds. 深刻领悟“两个确立”的决定性意义，增强“四个意识”、坚定“四个自信”、做到“两个维护".
That language has been in previous readouts of these ceremonies, and the Premier is not just going to forget those phrases. Meaningful? I have no idea. Strange? Seems like it. It would be something if that formula starts disappearing from other statements and readouts where it usually appears, but so far that has not happened. So just more guessing about a black box...